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the banking sector that they had come 
to rely on. Instability for banks has since 
been widely classified as constituting a 
financial crisis.
In our research, which is built on an 
extensive quantitative archival recon-
struction of the financial sector at the 
time of the crisis, we found that banks 
that failed were more highly valued be-
fore the crisis than those that did not. 
In the paper, we do not try to draw 
a literal comparison between the two 
separate crises, but there are clear 
similarities. For the median bank, for 
each percentage increase in leverage, 
we found that the probability of banks’ 
distress increases by about 50 per 
cent, showing that lower equity buff-
ers make banks vulnerable to shocks. 
This might sound horribly familiar to 
readers who are acquainted with the 
details of today's continuing global 
financial instability.
But equally there are clear differ-
ences. In the 1920s, for instance, there 
was no expectation among investors 
and bankers of government or central 
bank intervention. Struggling banks 
had little option but to resolve their 
own problems, either by addressing 
their lack of liquidity, by merging with 
or being acquired by another bank, or 
by going bankrupt. As a result, the crisis 
of the 1920s cost taxpayers significantly 
less than the more recent events, an 
estimated €1bn-€2bn in today's terms.
Moral hazard
As the financial industry, govern-
ments, central banks and regulators 
strive to return to “normal”, but dem-
onstrate that they have learnt from the 
I personally would argue that the 
disastrous financial events which be-
gan to unfold in July 2007 when the 
asset-backed commercial paper in the 
USA began to dry up, and gained mo-
mentum with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September the follow-
ing year, could have been avoided by 
learning from our financial past. At 
the very least, the scale of the impact 
of what has come to be known as the 
Global Financial Crisis could have been 
much reduced.
I make my case based on the 
research conducted for the paper 
Predicting the past: Understanding the 
causes of bank distress in the Netherlands 
in the 1920s, which I co-wrote with 
Chris Colvin of Queen’s Management 
School, Queen’s University Belfast, and 
Abe de Jong, Professor of Corporate 
Finance and Corporate Governance, 
at Rotterdam School of Management, 
Erasmus University.
A brief history lesson would probably 
be helpful as not everyone will be im-
mediately familiar with the specifics of 
Dutch financial history dating back al-
most a century. Dutch businesses ben-
efited greatly from the First World War, 
a conflict in which the Netherlands re-
mained neutral. A short post-war boom 
prolonged their prosperity. 
Then, in the early 1920s, the Dutch 
economy suffered a sharp deflationary 
recession. It is against this macroeco-
nomic backdrop that the financial crises 
of the day broke out. The large and sus-
tained declines in aggregate demand 
and prices sustained in the 1920s were 
the consequence of falling export de-
mand and monetary policy due to the 
gold standard. Debt deflation put pres-
sure both on Dutch businesses and on 
“Banks that find themselves in trouble 
because of their own business strategy and 
tactics should, as far as possible, be allowed 
to go bust.”
It is often said that people who fail to learn the lessons of history are 
fated to repeat it, both at the micro and the macro level. Many will 
argue that the assertion is as true of the banking industry as any 
other field of human activity. 
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experience, one vital must-have change 
is surely a revaluation of moral hazard. 
But what exactly is “moral hazard”? Put 
simply, it relates to consequences that 
arise from the certain knowledge that 
big banks have that however badly they 
conduct their business, however much 
they abuse the principles of sound 
banking in order to boost profits and 
the remuneration of those chasing 
profit, central banks and government 
will ride to their rescue as the ultimate 
lenders of last resort.
It is a phrase that has been leached 
of all resonance by overuse in the past 
few years, and is almost impossible 
to explain to even well-educated lay 
people. Perhaps we can turn to popu-
lar culture for an easier to understand 
analogy. For example, it has been ar-
gued on more than one occasion that 
Superman's girlfriend Lois Lane repeat-
edly finds herself in far riskier situations 
than her peer group because of her un-
erring faith that whatever happens, her 
super-powered boyfriend will swoop to 
her rescue. This Lois Lane Syndrome is 
moral hazard by another name.
If not eliminated, this phenomenon 
must at least be severely reduced in its 
impact. But for that to happen there 
has to be a change in the mindset of 
central banks and their governments. 
If Lois Lane can be chastised for taking 
on more risk than she ought to, she 
can in turn defend herself by arguing 
that she never asked for Superman to 
provide her with constant protection. 
For Superman, read central banks and 
governments.
The insistence of central banks and 
governments on riding to the rescue is 
very much part of the problem rather 
than a solution. Banks that find them-
selves in trouble because of their own 
business strategy and tactics should, as 
far as possible, be allowed to go bust. 
Unless the needs of the public outweigh 
the risks and costs involved in propping 
them up. 
If moral hazard is to be neutered as 
a threat to national and international 
banking systems, central banks and 
governments must discipline them-
selves. They must instead learn to let 
market events and thus financial evolu-
tion take their natural course. 
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